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Abstract
Using annual data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1961-2014, we study whether
labor market institutions (LMIs) not targeted to maternity impact the total fertility rate
(TFR). We distinguish between employment rigidities (ER) and real wage rigidities (RWR),
since the former reduces and the latter amplifies the response of the business cycle to shocks.
Panel regressions and principal component analysis reveal that ER, such as employment
protection and union strength, increase TFR. On the other hand, RWR, proxied by the
centralization of wage bargaining and unemployment benefits, reduce TFR. We also find
evidence that unemployment volatility reduces fertility whereas wage volatility raises fer-
tility. Thus, to the extent that labor market institutions affect unemployment and wage
volatility, they may also affect fertility. We complement our analysis with a DSGE model
that incorporates households’ fertility decision as well as unemployment and wage rigidities.
We find that downward wage rigidities amplify real contractions in response to negative
demand shocks and lead to large drops in employment and fertility.
JEL Classification: J01; J08; J13; J41; J51; D1
Keywords: fertility; labor market institutions; female labor force participation; income volatility;
DSGE
1 Introduction
Starting in the 1960s, the majority of OECD countries experienced a significant reduction in
fertility rates. During the same period, many countries adopted significant policies favoring
fertility, making it important to understand which forces contributed to the evolution in fertil-
ity rates. In this paper we investigate whether labor market institutions (LMIs) that are not
targeted to family-building, have an impact on fertility. Indeed a recent strand of the literature
has shown that fertility became pro-cyclical in many countries starting in the mid-1990s, sug-
gesting that there could have been changes in the economic framework that contributed to this
fact.
Fertility decisions are affected by the possibility of large income shocks. Labor market
institutions, to the extent that they affect volatility of unemployment and wages, may indirectly
impact the level of fertility and its responsiveness to business cycles. Employment rigidities,
restricting flows in and out of employment, reduce the volatility of unemployment. Real wage
rigidities instead restrict wage movements and lead firms to adjust employment by more in
response to shocks. In this way, real wage rigidities amplify the response of real business cycles
to shocks, whereas employment rigidities act by dampening them. This channel, whereby LMIs
affect fertility through the volatility of unemployment and real wages, has not been studied in
∗We would like to thank Evi Pappa, David Domeij, and Juan Dolado for their comments and suggestions, as
well as seminar participants at the Stockholm School of Economics Lunch Seminar, EUI Macro Working group,
and TADC conference at the London Business School for helpful comments and suggestions.
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the literature. This mechanism has relevant policy implications, whereby labor market reforms
could indirectly affect household fertility decisions.
Using annual data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1961-2014, we study how the evo-
lution of labor markets have impacted the total fertility rate (TFR). We control for the elements
that can directly affect the fertility rate, such as maternity benefits, family allowances, female
labor force participation, the gender wage gap, and economic conditions such as the unemploy-
ment rate and GDP growth. In our empirical analysis we compute the principal components
of a large set of labor market institutions, which represent both employment rigidities (ER)
and real wage rigidities (RWR). This approach allows us to reduce the number of regressors
and consider the impact of interactions and combinations of institutions, having interpretable
results.
Adopting panel regression analysis we find that the overall effect of labor market rigidities
on fertility is the result of two opposing forces: wage and employment frictions. Considering
specific groups of LMIs we find that employment protection legislation (EPL) and union strength
(UnS) are positively correlated with fertility, whereas wage bargaining centralization (WB) and
unemployment benefits (UB) are negatively correlated with fertility. These findings can be
explained by the following facts: (i) EPL represents a clear employment rigidity that tends
to reduce the volatility of employment; (ii) UnS can potentially adhere to bargaining over
wages or employment (manning ratios)1 and while we take an agnostic stance our empirical
evidence suggests the latter effect; and (iii) WB and UB act as real wage rigidities, which have
been found to increase the volatility of employment. Unemployment benefits may act as an
imperfect substitute to maternity benefits but may also affect the reservation wage of workers,
limiting de-facto real wage adjustments, and encouraging flows into and out of employment.
Since fertility decisions are largely affected by the risk of becoming unemployed, we expect that
unemployment volatility could have a negative impact on fertility.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by taking a wider perspective on the anal-
ysis of fertility decision that examines the role of labor market institutions not targeted to
fertility. For example, we do not consider unemployment benefits just as a possible substitute
to maternity benefits and allowances, but we investigate its impact on labor income risk and
volatility. Another contribution of this paper is the collection of data for 20 OECD countries
for a time period of more than 50 years, which allows us to control for potential country or
period-specific dynamics of fertility rates.
Finally, in order to better explain our empirical results and to be able to analyze policies we
construct a theoretical model that incorporates household fertility decisions (in a similar fashion
to Lagerborg (2016)) as well as detailed labor market frictions.2 Children provide households
with direct and durable utility, but also entail two types of costs: (i) a consumption cost that
enters the household budget constraint, and (ii) a time cost for women in terms of time away
from work and leisure. Finally, the decision to have children is irriversible, i.e. births are non-
negative.3 Our model also has search and matching frictions in the labor market and Nash
bargaining over wages and hours. We include Rotemberg-type adjustment costs for wages and
employment with an asymmetric component that creates downward rigidity. Downward wage
rigidity amplifies the business cycle contraction in response to negative demand shocks, with
sizeable effects on unemployment and fertility in the short run and a drop in long-run fertility
rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature related to this
work. Section 3 describes the data for fertility, labor market institutions and the covariates used
in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results from our regression analysis.
1Petrakis and Vlassisb (2000) find that if unions’ power is sufficiently high, they bargain solely over wages
supporting the right-to-manage model hypothesis; otherwise they bargain over both wages and employment.
2Model results are preliminary and may change in the next version of our working paper.
3This occasionally binding constraint is not currently implemented in our model. We expect to include this
in the next version of our working paper.
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Section 5 outlines our DSGE model with household fertility decisions and labor market frictions.
Section 6 describes the model calibration and dynamics. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Related literature
The literature related to this paper can be divided broadly into three groups. The first strand,
represented by Easterlin (1961), Erosa et al. (2002), Doepke et al. (2007), Orsal and Goldstein
(2010) and Doepke and Kindermann (2014) among others, studies household fertility decisions
and tries to explain the pattern of fertility rates post World War II. The second group is the
one that analyzes the evolution and dynamics of female labor force participation and how this
impacts fertility, in particular Ermisch (1988), Fernandez et al. (2004), Orazio Attanasio (2008),
Jones et al. (2008), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) and Olivetti (2013).
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that studies the impact of labor market
frictions on the volatility of macroeconomic outcomes, such as Rumler and Scharler (2009),
Abbritti and Weber (2010), Merkl and Schmitz (2011), Faccini and Bondibene (2012), Abbritti
and Fahr (2013), and Gnocchi et al. (2015). This literature has found that employment rigidities
tend to reduce the volatility of unemployment, without significantly affecting real wages, whereas
real wage rigidities increase the volatility of unemployment. We exploit the results of this
literature to identify a channel that links labor market institutions with fertility decisions. In
particular, Abbritti and Weber (2010) investigated the importance of labor market institutions
for inflation and unemployment dynamics. They divided LMIs between those responsible for
employment rigidities (ER) and those that cause real wage rigidities (RWR), since these two
types of institutions may have opposite dynamic effects on macroeconomics outcomes. If ER and
RWR are complements their opposite effects tend to cancel each other out, since a high degree
of ER is associated with lower unemployment volatility and high RWR are associated with
high unemployment volatility. If instead they are substitutes, there could be an amplification
effect. The authors found that a higher degree of employment rigidities reduces the volatility of
unemployment and vacancies but increases the volatility of real wages. On the other hand, real
wage rigidities increase the volatility of unemployment. Faccini and Bondibene (2012) instead
investigated the impact of nine labor market institutions on unemployment volatility, finding
that some LMIs matter for unemployment dynamics over the business cycle. Finally, Gnocchi
et al. (2015) have found that more flexible labor institutions are associated with lower business
cycles and lower unemployment volatility.
In this paper we want to take a broader point of view with respect to the existing literature
on fertility, in order to consider an aspect that quite surprisingly has been largely ignored by
the literature that investigates fertility dynamics: the legal framework of labor markets. Hence
our work does not focus only on the main drivers of fertility that have been analyzed by the
existing literature, but it considers additional elements that may impact the decision of having
children, such as employment volatility and real wage volatility. The papers that are closest
to our work are Adsera (2004) and Adsera (2011), which analyze the role of maternity benefits
and allowances for fertility decisions, controlling for the impact of unemployment benefits,
employment protection and share of public employment. In this paper we use a much wider set
of labor market institutions and we also take into account their combinations and interactions.
3 The data
We collected annual data from 1961 to 2014 for 20 OECD countries using different sources.4
The time period we consider is long enough to analyze both business cycle fluctuations and
4All variables are plotted in the Appendix.
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the long-run trend in the total fertility rate. Moreover we analyze a relatively large sample of
countries in order to account for possible country-specific differences in fertility. The countries
included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
United Kingdom and United States.
3.1 Total fertility rate
Our variable of interest is the total fertility rate (TFR), defined as the average number of
children per woman. The measure of TFR that we use in our main analyses is from the OECD
Health Database. Figure 7 shows the evolution of TFR from 1960 to 2014 for each of the
countries considered. There has been a general downward trend in TFR between the 1960s and
the 1970/80s, after which the total fertility rate stabilized. Figure 8 presents the average value
of TFR in the period considered (red diamonds) as well as its dynamics over time (blue circles).
This shows more clearly how some countries that started with a very high TFR, as Canada or
Ireland, converged towards lower levels, while other countries that had already a low TFR, as
Japan or Sweden, experienced a smaller evolution over the last 50 years.
For robustness, we also consider the birth rate measured as number of births per 1000
women aged between 15 and 49, obtained from the OECD.5 Figure 7 shows that birth rates
follow a very similar path to TFR. Birth rates have been steeply decreasing for age group 20-24
and increasing for age group 30-34, reflecting fertility postponement. Figure 9 shows birth rates
for different age groups. Women in age groups 15-19 and over 40 have very low birth rates in
all countries considered.
3.2 Labor market institutions
We gathered data describing labor market institutions from the OECD and Data Base on In-
stitutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts
(ITCWSS). We have variables that represent both employment rigidities and real wage rigidities.
In particular, we consider the set of LMI indicators described in Table 10. Table 11 provides
descriptive statistics for each LMI. Figures 12-25 show the evolution of each LMI by country and
over time. Employment protection institutions show very little variation, with few exceptions for
countries such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, which experienced substancial
reductions in protection. Union density, coverage, and concentration faced more heterogeneous
changes in the last decades, with some countries increasing and others decreasing the strength
of unions. Institutions that affect real wage rigidities include the centralization and level of
wage bargaining, government intervention in the bargaining process, the extension of collective
agreements, and the minimum wage. We see substantial variation in wage bargaining central-
ization and government intervention. We observe a general reduction in the minimum wage for
countries such as Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. Unemployment benefits
are defined as an average of benefit replacement rates and generally have displayed an increase
in generosity since 1960.
3.3 Control variables
As control variables, we want to account for all other factors that can affect the fertility decision.
First, we control for maternity benefits and family allowances that are related to maternity
or paternity. This is necessary in order to be able to disentangle the effect between labor
institutions targeted to fertility and those that do not specifically target fertility decisions. We
5The starting year for data on birth rates by age groups is later for some countries in our sample, namely:
Norway in 1961, New Zealand in 1962, Sweden in 1968, US in 1970, Spain in 1971, UK in 1973, France in 1998,
and Canada and Germany in 2000.
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obtain this data from Gauthier (2011) for the period 1960-2010 and extend it until 2014 using
the same data source, compiled from Social Security Programs Throughout the World and the
Council of Europe. Second, we control for economic conditions such as GDP growth (obtained
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators), unemployment rate (obtained from the
IMF Economic Outlook and Gauthier (2011)), and the NAIRU (obtained from the OECD).
These are important as many empirical papers have found that fertility relates to the business
cycle. Finally, we also control for gender differentials such as female labor force participation
and the gender wage gap, constructed using male and female wages obtained from the OECD.
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics for our control variables.
3.4 Principal component analysis
In order to take into account the effects of combinations and interactions among labor market
institutions, we adopt principal component analysis. This allows us to include a large number of
LMIs in our estimates, reducing possible omitted variable bias, and at the same time allowing to
save degrees of freedom and to have interpretable results from our empirical analysis. We divide
LMIs on the basis of economic meaning, into four different groups of rigidities: (i) employment
protection, (ii) union strength, (iii) wage bargaining, and (iv) unemployment benefits. For each
group, we compute principal components that we call LMI Factors.
We also construct principal components of the control variables for the same reasoning.
In particular we calculate one component for maternity benefits, one for economic conditions
and one for the gender gap. In total we get three principal components that we call Principal
Controls.
3.4.1 LMI Factors
We divide the LMI indicators into four groups, on the basis of economic reasoning: employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL), union strength (UnS), wage bargaining centralization (WB),
and unemployment benefits (UB). EPL is the principal component combining employment pro-
tection legislation on permanent and temporary contracts. UnS summarizes union density,
coverage, and concentration. We classify EPL and UnS as employment rigidities (ER).6 WB
comprises the centralization and level of wage bargaining, government intervention in the bar-
gaining process, the extension of collective agreements, and the minimum wage. UB is defined
as an average of benefit replacement rates and acts both as a substitute to maternity bene-
fits but also increases the reservation wage, affecting employment inflows and outflows. In our
framework both WB and UB are representative of real wage rigidities. Table 13 shows the
correlation between the four LMI Factors and the original labor market institutions.
3.4.2 Principal Controls
We calculate three principal components that we use as control variables. One principal compo-
nent combines maternity benefits and family allowances, which we label PC maternity. Another
principal component combines GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and NAIRU, which we
label PC economy. Finally, we create a principal component for the gender gap, combining
female labor force participation and the wage gap, which we label PC gender. Table 14 shows
the correlation between the three principal controls and the original covariates.
6Unions’ strength factor could theoretically be included in either group, depending on the role of unions in
increasing employment protection or limiting downward adjustment of wages. A priori we do not take a stance
on this but our empirical evidence seems to suggest that unions act mainly as an employment rigidity.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Panel regression analysis
In this section we document the correlation between LMIs and the total fertility rate. In order
to exploit both the cross-sectional and over-time variation of the data, we use panel regression
analysis with country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific time trends. Country
fixed effects account for the fact that there may exist country-specific preferences for fertility.
Year fixed effects account for average fertility changes across years. For example, it takes into
account the clear downward trend in fertility rates observed before the 1980s. Finally, the
country-specific time trend allow for trends to vary across countries. Our baseline regression
reads:
TFRi,t = α+ β
′LMIi,t + γ′Xi,t + µi + νt + cstti,t + εi,t
where TFRi,t is total fertility rate in year t in country i, α is a constant, µi are country fixed
effects, νt are year fixed effects, and cstti represent the country-specific time trends. LMIi,t
is the vector of labor market institutions or their principal components. Xi,t represents the
set of principal components derived from the original control variables and is the same for all
specifications.
4.1.1 Evidence from Principal Components
Table 1 shows the panel fixed effects regression estimates using the four LMI Factors. Column (1)
represents our preferred model, while columns (2)-(5) present results including one LMI Factor
at the time. From column (1), we can see that EPL and UnS, both employment rigidities,
are positively correlated with fertility. The fact that EPL has a positive impact on fertility
is not surprising since employment protection increases the perception of economic stability of
households and reduces the volatility of employment. The positive sign for union strength can
be explained by the fact that unions work for preventing large employment adjustments, acting
then as an employment rigidity. WB and UB instead, are negatively correlated with fertility,
and behave as real wage rigidities. WB tends to reduce the volatility of wages at the expense
of increasing the volatility of employment, having a negative impact on fertility. The negative
sign for UB suggests that its role is more similar to a real wage rigidity than to a substitute
for maternity benefits. By comparing the first column with the others, we find that results are
robust to considering one factor at a time.
By decomposing the effects of each LMI factor, we observe that wage bargaining rigidi-
ties drive most of the variation in TFR (see Figure 10).7 Among the employment rigidities,
union strength appears to be the most relevant. We can furthermore see the effects played
by our control variables (see Figure 11). Economic conditions and maternity benefits seem to
play a major role in impacting fertility. Gender inequality appears to be less important, but
consistently slightly depresses fertility, consistent with diminishing gender gaps.
4.1.2 Evidence from Individual LMIs
Looking at individual LMIs, panel regression results confirm that rigidities related to employ-
ment have a positive effect on fertility, whereas rigidities related to wages affect fertility nega-
tively (see Table 2). EPL for permanent contracts appear to favor fertility, whilst this rigidity
7We also compute the first principal component considering all labor market institutions together at once,
representing a measure of overall rigidity of the labor market. We robustly find that more rigid labor markets
are associated with lower total fertility rates. This finding is consistent with the notion that an overall more
rigid labor market leads to higher volatility in unemployment and business cycles more generally (Gnocchi et al.,
2015). Results are available from the authors upon request.
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has no significant effect for temporary contracts (columns 1-2). Rigidities related to union
strength are positively correlated with fertility with the exception of union coverage (columns
3-5). It is possible that union coverage does not translate to higher employment rigidity if
collective agreements are wage-related.
Wage rigidities appear to depress fertility. More rigid wage bargaining—as measured by the
degree of government intervention, the level at which bargaining takes place, the extension of
collective agreements, centralization of wage bargaining, and the minimum wage—is negatively
correlated with fertility (columns 6-11). As aforementioned, unemployment benefits may act as
a substitute to maternity benefits but they can also increase the reservation wage of workers,
acting as a downward wage rigidity, and this could explain the negative correlation found with
fertility (column 12).
4.1.3 Robustness: Evidence from Birth Rates by Age
As a robustness check, we repeat the same analysis using birth rates (per 1,000 females) by
age groups. Regression results using average birth rates are very similar to TFR (see Table 4).
Signs and significance are robust for most age groups. Looking at LMI factors, results are in line
with our main estimation (see Table 3). Employment rigidities carry a positive sign for all age
groups except: EPL for age groups 30-34 and 45-49 (where the latter is insignificant) and UnS
for age group 15-19.8 Real wage rigidities are even more robust: all age groups have the correct
sign. More rigid or centralized wage bargaining tends to reduce birth rates. Unemployment
benefits also robustly reduce birth rates.
Considering individual LMIs, results for average births again remain robust. We obtain
that EPL is significant for permanent contracts, confirming robustness of our results using TFR.
Whereas EPL on permanent contracts shifts births from older to younger cohorts (under 30),
EPL has the opposite effect on temporary contracts. LMIs governing the strength of unions
have a positive effect on birth rates.9 Wage bargaining rigidities and the unemployment benefit
depress birth rates. We note that the youngest cohort, aged 15-19, seems to respond differently
to several labor market institutions, with opposite signs to other age groups.
4.1.4 Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications
We conduct several robustness checks with respect to alternative specifications (see Table 16).
We consider a specification that omits the country-specific time trend (column 2). We also
consider a generalized least squares specification that corrects for potential country-specific serial
correlation in residuals (column 3). Finally, we implement Wild Cluster Bootstap that corrects
standard errors for the small number of country clusters (column 4). Coefficient signs and
significance remain mostly robust, although significance is largely reduced when implementing
the Wild Cluster Bootstrap procedure.
As additional robustness check, we want to asses whether the results depend on our use of
specific principal controls. Therefore as first alternative specification we performed our panel
regressions with a principal component for maternity, which includes separately maternity ben-
efits length and generosity, and that presents family allowances for different number of children
separately. Finally, in order to exclude the possibility that the use per se of principal compo-
nent analysis is driving our results we perform the same empirical analysis using directly the
eight control variables which were used to compute the three principal controls. The results
8EPL appears to shift births towards younger age groups (higher coefficients for younger cohorts). On the
other hand, union strength appears to reduce birth rates only for the youngest cohort (ages 15-19), who might
not reap benefits from union negotiations over higher pay and number of employees.
9Union coverage, which had a negative sign for TFR, here is insignificant. However, we see that union coverage
shifts births from younger to older cohorts.
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under these two alternative specifications are very similar with respect to those of our baseline
model.10
Another check we do is with respect to the timing of fertility and institutional change.
Changes in institutions may take time to be implemented and tend to be announced in ad-
vance. Our baseline specification in which we consider TFR at time t considers announcement
effects. If institutions are announced in advance and if fertility responds to such annoucements,
a contemporaneous regression should capture this since TFR at time t will be affected by an-
nouncement in t-1 of institutional change at time t. If we instead disregard announcement
effects, we would expect institutions announced and implemented in time t to affect household
fertility decisions taken contemporaneously, which would show up in data on fertility and birth
rates in time t+1. We consider both timings and results are consistent even when using lead
fertility (see Tables 15 and 17).11
Table 1: Panel Regressions with LMI Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR
EPL 0.0618** 0.0713***
(0.0260) (0.0264)
UnS 0.0895*** 0.0522**
(0.0228) (0.0214)
WB -0.0592*** -0.0462***
(0.0103) (0.00981)
UB -0.00238** -0.00321***
(0.00103) (0.00103)
PC maternity 0.0448*** 0.0470*** 0.0442*** 0.0433*** 0.0504***
(0.00996) (0.00999) (0.0100) (0.00992) (0.0101)
PC economy 0.0365*** 0.0278*** 0.0339*** 0.0379*** 0.0293***
(0.00993) (0.00994) (0.00984) (0.00981) (0.00984)
PC gender 0.0250 0.0346* 0.0320* 0.0289 0.0234
(0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0194)
Constant 14.78*** 15.27*** 15.21*** 15.96*** 15.50***
(0.833) (0.828) (0.837) (0.811) (0.816)
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
R-squared 0.898 0.893 0.893 0.895 0.894
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
10The tables with the results of these robustness checks are not included in the paper to save space, but are
available upon request.
11One potential concern regards endogeneity. There could, for example, exist a political economy effect through
which high fertility leads society to want more employment protection. For the next version of this working paper
we hope to include evidence such as including more lags and leads of LMIs.
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Table 2: Panel Regressions with Individual LMIs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR
EPL (perm. contracts) 0.277*** 0.185***
(0.0481) (0.0472)
EPL (temp. contracts) 0.00854 0.0179
(0.0136) (0.0142)
Union density 0.00985*** 0.00384***
(0.00155) (0.00139)
Union coverage -0.00233** -0.00258**
(0.00108) (0.00109)
Union concentration 1.008*** 0.725***
(0.197) (0.158)
WB centralization -0.449*** -0.264**
(0.167) (0.123)
Gov. intervention in WB -0.0298*** -0.0327***
(0.00820) (0.00767)
WB level 0.00114 -0.0206**
(0.00869) (0.00826)
Ext. of coll. agreements -0.0877*** -0.0424**
(0.0204) (0.0172)
Minimum wage -0.0272*** -0.0212***
(0.00561) (0.00582)
Unemployment benefit -0.00246** -0.00321***
(0.00104) (0.00103)
PC maternity 0.0462*** 0.0507*** 0.0457*** 0.0433*** 0.0476*** 0.0482*** 0.0440*** 0.0479*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 0.0413*** 0.0504***
(0.00976) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.00993) (0.0100) (0.00994) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101)
PC economy 0.0314*** 0.0287*** 0.0304*** 0.0364*** 0.0300*** 0.0266*** 0.0353*** 0.0319*** 0.0362*** 0.0343*** 0.0299*** 0.0293***
(0.00981) (0.00981) (0.00993) (0.00992) (0.00986) (0.00981) (0.00992) (0.00975) (0.00994) (0.00985) (0.00979) (0.00984)
PC gender 0.0502*** 0.0311 0.0333* 0.0362* 0.0406** 0.0430** 0.0323* 0.0288 0.0312 0.0310 0.0261 0.0234
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0194)
Constant 12.26*** 14.78*** 15.50*** 14.72*** 15.87*** 15.14*** 15.64*** 15.98*** 15.86*** 15.79*** 16.16*** 15.50***
(0.916) (0.842) (0.828) (0.884) (0.820) (0.817) (0.816) (0.814) (0.819) (0.817) (0.823) (0.816)
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
R-squared 0.908 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.895 0.893 0.895 0.893 0.893 0.894 0.894
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Panel Regressions with LMI Factors and Birth Rate by Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Av. birth Birth 15-19 Birth 20-24 Birth 25-29 Birth 30-34 Birth 35-39 Birth 40-44 Birth 45-49
EPL 1.315 0.969 9.581*** 1.187 -3.192** 0.331 0.109 -0.0121
(0.905) (0.825) (2.122) (2.185) (1.620) (1.034) (0.393) (0.0397)
UnS 5.069*** -2.226*** 1.599 11.28*** 12.96*** 8.217*** 2.847*** 0.212***
(0.696) (0.635) (1.633) (1.681) (1.247) (0.796) (0.303) (0.0306)
WB -2.122*** -0.251 -2.793*** -3.273*** -3.606*** -3.345*** -1.216*** -0.110***
(0.278) (0.253) (0.652) (0.671) (0.497) (0.318) (0.121) (0.0122)
UB -0.0926*** -0.233*** -0.336*** -0.0249 -0.0147 -0.0269 -0.0144 -0.00512***
(0.0275) (0.0250) (0.0644) (0.0663) (0.0492) (0.0314) (0.0119) (0.00121)
PC maternity 2.298*** -0.406 3.038*** 4.657*** 3.183*** 3.857*** 1.532*** 0.144***
(0.286) (0.260) (0.670) (0.690) (0.511) (0.326) (0.124) (0.0125)
PC economy 0.993*** 0.307 0.529 1.349** 2.993*** 1.685*** 0.203* -0.0100
(0.267) (0.244) (0.627) (0.645) (0.479) (0.305) (0.116) (0.0117)
PC gender 1.199** -0.435 -0.930 7.407*** 2.526*** -0.544 0.259 0.0346
(0.543) (0.495) (1.274) (1.311) (0.972) (0.621) (0.236) (0.0238)
Constant 354.9*** 199.7*** 1,144*** 854.0*** 67.61 82.19*** 122.1*** 11.17***
(25.16) (22.95) (59.03) (60.78) (45.07) (28.77) (10.94) (1.103)
Observations 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 913
R-squared 0.908 0.874 0.943 0.904 0.882 0.917 0.927 0.908
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Panel Regressions with Individual LMIs and Birth Rate by Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Av. birth Birth 15-19 Birth 20-24 Birth 25-29 Birth 30-34 Birth 35-39 Birth 40-44 Birth 45-49
EPL (perm. contracts) 2.774** 7.306*** 20.84*** 4.182 -7.815*** -3.972** -1.552*** -0.133**
(1.376) (1.212) (3.153) (3.365) (2.514) (1.549) (0.575) (0.0588)
EPL (temp. contracts) 0.525 -1.096** 2.423** 0.358 0.292 0.948 0.479** 0.0417*
(0.526) (0.463) (1.204) (1.286) (0.961) (0.592) (0.220) (0.0225)
Union density 0.228*** -0.135*** 0.366*** 0.747*** 0.374*** 0.141*** 0.0612*** 0.00583***
(0.0444) (0.0392) (0.102) (0.109) (0.0812) (0.0500) (0.0186) (0.00190)
Union coverage 0.00535 -0.156*** -0.377*** -0.0357 0.299*** 0.159*** 0.100*** 0.0104***
(0.0434) (0.0383) (0.0995) (0.106) (0.0793) (0.0489) (0.0182) (0.00186)
Union concentration 47.32*** 25.43*** 63.45*** 66.24*** 80.51*** 68.29*** 21.02*** 1.387***
(5.930) (5.227) (13.59) (14.51) (10.84) (6.680) (2.480) (0.254)
WB centralization -20.79*** -24.08*** -38.53*** -35.05*** -22.99*** -16.72*** -2.467 0.0268
(4.641) (4.090) (10.64) (11.35) (8.482) (5.227) (1.940) (0.199)
Gov. intervention in WB -0.814*** -0.171 -1.373** -1.487** -1.652*** -0.679** -0.125 -0.0116
(0.244) (0.215) (0.558) (0.596) (0.445) (0.274) (0.102) (0.0104)
WB level -0.136 0.684*** 0.777 0.291 -0.706* -1.506*** -0.639*** -0.0608***
(0.231) (0.204) (0.530) (0.565) (0.422) (0.260) (0.0966) (0.00990)
Ext. of coll. agreements -2.229*** 0.677 -6.442*** -4.141*** -2.377** -1.392** -1.321*** -0.179***
(0.548) (0.483) (1.255) (1.340) (1.001) (0.617) (0.229) (0.0235)
Minimum wage -0.315* 0.206 0.564 -1.114*** -0.330 -1.000*** -0.481*** -0.0297***
(0.162) (0.143) (0.372) (0.398) (0.297) (0.183) (0.0679) (0.00695)
Unemployment benefit -0.0504* -0.213*** -0.273*** 0.00838 0.0598 0.0367 0.0135 -0.00246**
(0.0286) (0.0252) (0.0655) (0.0699) (0.0523) (0.0322) (0.0120) (0.00122)
PC maternity 2.181*** -0.166 2.916*** 3.914*** 3.234*** 3.767*** 1.413*** 0.133***
(0.288) (0.254) (0.659) (0.704) (0.526) (0.324) (0.120) (0.0123)
PC economy 0.906*** 0.0763 0.634 1.610** 2.686*** 1.320*** 0.120 -0.0120
(0.269) (0.237) (0.617) (0.659) (0.492) (0.303) (0.113) (0.0115)
PC gender 2.252*** 0.473 1.550 8.741*** 3.751*** 0.619 0.487** 0.0449*
(0.567) (0.500) (1.299) (1.387) (1.036) (0.639) (0.237) (0.0242)
Constant 306.1*** 165.9*** 979.8*** 746.6*** 35.25 90.19*** 124.9*** 11.03***
(27.79) (24.50) (63.70) (67.99) (50.80) (31.31) (11.62) (1.188)
Observations 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 913
R-squared 0.915 0.891 0.949 0.908 0.886 0.926 0.938 0.919
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.2 Investigating the Mechanism
4.2.1 The roles of wage volatility, unemployment volatility, and the unemployment
rate
Fertility decisions are affected by the possibility of large income shocks. As a result, movements
in wages may affect household fertility decisions. Even larger income shocks are generated by
unemployment. The unemployment rate, proxying for the probability of becoming unemployed,
is expected to detriment fertility. Similarly, unemployment volatility generates fluctuations in
this probability of unemployment, and hence potential fluctuations in income.
We use panel regressions with country and year fixed effects to explore the effect of un-
employment and wage volatility on fertility outcomes. To obtain measures for volatility, we
collapse the data into decadal frequency and measure the standard deviation of unemployment
and wages over the decade.12 This reduces our sample from approximately 1,000 observations
to 120 observations (6 decades for 20 countries), making statistical significance more difficult
to obtain.
Table 5 investigates the role played by volatility in unemployment, in real/nominal wages,
and in expected wages, as well as the level of the unemployment rate, in affecting the total
fertility rate.13 We find that unemployment volatility negatively correlates with fertility (column
1) whereas real and nominal wage volatility (columns 2 and 3) positively correlate with fertility.
The combined effect of wage and unemployment volatility can be analyzed by considering the
volatility of expected real wages, defined as the product of real wages and the employment rate
(one minus the unemployment rate). Volatility in expected real wages is detrimental to fertility
(column 4).
We interpret this as suggestive evidence that income risks associated with unemployment
outweigh those associated with wage fluctuations in shaping household fertility decisions. Higher
unemployment volatility is detrimental to fertility. By contrast, higher wage volatility means
firms can adjust wages rather than employment, thereby reducing the large income risks associ-
ated with unemployment. Thus, we expect that more flexibility in LMIs governing employment
rigidities, allowing for higher unemployment volatility, reduces fertility. In contrast, more flexi-
bility in LMIs governing wage rigidities, allowing for higher volatility of wages, should increase
fertility.
To investigate this hypothesis we estimate the effect of labor market institutions on volatil-
ity of unemployment, wages, and expected wages (see Table 6). We find that ERs such as EPL
on permanent contracts reduces volatility of employment and expected wages, while increasing
volatility of real wages. By contrast, RWRs such as centralized wage bargaining and unemploy-
ment benefits reduce volatility of real wages, at the expense of higher volatility of employment
and expected wages.
Another discussion worth having is on the role of unemployment volatility versus unemploy-
ment levels. A higher unemployment rate translates into a higher overall probability of being
unemployed. Higher unemployment volatility, on the other hand, does not necessarily translate
into a higher risk of unemployment. Instead it means higher uncertainty over the probability
of unemployment. This leads us to question what matters for fertility: is it the unemployment
rate in levels or its volatility? Both seem to matter as can be seen in Table 5. Higher volatility
of unemployment and higher unemployment rates both reduce fertility (columns 1 and 5). This
result is robust to including both variables together (column 6).
12In our main estimates we use average male wages to compute the volatility of nominal and real wages. Results
are also robust to using female wages and the average of male and female wages.
13Results are robust to using birth rates and to including maternity, economy, and gender principal controls.
We do not include the economy principal control from specifications that include the level of unemployment,
namely columns 6-8. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5: The Role of Unemployment vs. Wage Volatility for Fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR
Vol(u) -0.118*** -0.0973**
(0.0402) (0.0408)
Vol(w/p) 0.0747***
(0.0239)
Vol(w) 0.0690**
(0.0293)
Vol(EW) -0.0994**
(0.0481)
u -0.0280*** -0.0217**
(0.0105) (0.0106)
Constant 2.827*** 2.698*** 2.758*** 2.828*** 2.833*** 2.864***
(0.0536) (0.0563) (0.0528) (0.0598) (0.0555) (0.0557)
Observations 120 100 100 91 120 120
R-squared 0.807 0.826 0.817 0.823 0.804 0.815
Country FE
Year FE
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
13
Table 6: The Role of LMIs for Volatility of Employment and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(EW) Vol(EW) Vol(EW)
PC maternity -0.000507 -0.000572 -0.000542 0.561*** 0.525*** 0.515*** 0.0442*** 0.0446*** 0.0447***
(0.000838) (0.000834) (0.000839) (0.171) (0.169) (0.175) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0146)
PC economy -8.42e-05 -0.00116 -0.000888 -0.0994 0.0971 0.0185 -0.0243 -0.0235 -0.0235
(0.00100) (0.000846) (0.000856) (0.198) (0.191) (0.195) (0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0164)
PC gender -0.00158 -0.00156 -0.00172 0.320 0.318 0.209 0.0290 0.0275 0.0282
(0.00153) (0.00152) (0.00154) (0.319) (0.317) (0.325) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0257)
EPL (perm.) -0.00601* 1.742** 0.0155
(0.00327) (0.824) (0.0846)
WB centralization 0.0220** -4.695** 0.0159
(0.0102) (2.028) (0.176)
UB 0.000133* -0.00537 -0.000143
(7.19e-05) (0.0156) (0.00122)
Constant 0.0193*** -0.00171 0.00507* -2.682 2.825*** 1.180* 0.119 0.148* 0.157***
(0.00715) (0.00483) (0.00283) (1.865) (0.922) (0.614) (0.193) (0.0778) (0.0489)
Observations 120 120 120 100 100 100 95 95 95
R-squared 0.434 0.442 0.435 0.525 0.530 0.496 0.287 0.287 0.287
Country FE
Year FE
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.2.2 Two Stage Least Squares
One channel through which labor market institutions may affect fertility outcomes is through
the volatility of unemployment, wages, and expected wages. In order to study this channel,
we employ a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation in which LMIs act as instruments for
volatility. We expect employment rigidities, such as EPL and UnS, to reduce the volatility
of unemployment (while allowing for higher volatility of wages) and thereby increase fertility.
Real wage rigidities, such as WB and UB, are expected to reduce the volatility of wages at the
expense of higher volatility of unemployment, thereby reducing fertility.
We remain cautious in interpreting results as evidence in favor of our hypothesized channel.
To the extent that there may exist other channels through which labor market institutions affect
fertility, which are correlated with our measures of volatility of unemployment and wages, our
results may also be capturing these other channels. This could happen, for example, if LMIs
affect the level of expected wages and unemployment, which in turn affect fertility. In other
words, we cannot exclude the fact that there may be other channels acting that our simply
correlated with ours. The evidence presented here should be thought of as not excluding the
possibility of our channel, rather than proving our channel.
We find scattered evidence that these predicted results are consistent with the data. Table
7 presents results for our estimations using two stage least squares.14 The first channel we
consider is whether labor market rigidities affect fertility through the volatility of unemployment
(columns 1-4). The LMI factors yield no significance with the exception of UB. This may be
due to the small sample size making it difficult to obtain statistically significance. We thus turn
to evidence from individual LMIs, three of which yield significant results.15 EPL relating to
permanent contracts16 is found to reduce unemployment volatility and thereby increase fertility
(column 1). Wage bargaining centralization and unemployment benefits, both considered real
wage rigidities, on the other hand increase unemployment volatility thereby reducing fertility
(columns 2-3). In the first stage of the regression, each of these LMIs when considered separately
matters in explaining unemployment volatility, however when all three LMIs are included, we
lose significance possibly because of the small sample size. In the second stage, we observe that
the unemployment volatility induced by these LMIs is detrimental for fertility. This two-stage
analysis thus shows us that to the extent that these labor market institutions affect the volatility
of unemployment, they also affect fertility.
Second, we study the channel by which LMIs affect fertility through real wage volatility
(columns 5-8). The effect of LMIs through the volatility of wages carries the opposite sign.
To the extent that LMIs increase real wage volatility, this has a positive effect on fertility.
Employment protection on permanent contracts increases the volatility of real wages whereas
more centralized (rigid) wage bargaining reduces real wage volatility. Unemployment benefits,
despite having the predicted (negative) sign, have no significant effect on real wages.
Finally, we study the combined effect of unemployment and wages by studying the channel
whereby LMIs affect fertility through the volatility of expected wages (see Table 8). Estimates
carry the same sign as in the unemployment volatility channel.
14All results are robust to using birth rates instead of TFR. Results are avialable from the authors upon
request.
15No significance is obtained for LMIs relating to union strength.
16EPL relating to temporary contracts has no effect.
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Table 7: 2SLS - Role of Unemployment and Wage Volatility
2nd Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV: EPL IV: WB IV: UB IV: All IV: EPL IV: WB IV: UB IV: All
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR
Vol(u) -0.709* -0.591** -0.282 -0.521***
(0.394) (0.292) (0.229) (0.199)
PC maternity 0.0383 0.0435 0.0570 0.0466 -0.0689 -0.0460 -0.239 -0.0548
(0.0631) (0.0540) (0.0369) (0.0486) (0.101) (0.0857) (0.931) (0.0793)
PC economy -0.0116 0.000974 0.0340 0.00851 0.0192 0.0203 0.0112 0.0199
(0.0747) (0.0617) (0.0436) (0.0530) (0.0648) (0.0584) (0.130) (0.0607)
PC gender 0.0460 0.0616 0.102 0.0709 0.0430 0.0519 -0.0235 0.0485
(0.122) (0.103) (0.0714) (0.0911) (0.112) (0.100) (0.415) (0.103)
Vol(w/p) 0.316* 0.271** 0.650 0.288**
(0.162) (0.134) (1.819) (0.114)
Constant 3.086*** 3.002*** 2.783*** 2.952*** 2.338*** 2.387*** 1.972 2.368***
(0.338) (0.264) (0.197) (0.206) (0.256) (0.222) (2.016) (0.213)
Observations 120 120 120 120 100 100 100 100
Country FE
Year FE
1st Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p)
PC maternity -0.0507 -0.0572 -0.0542 -0.0663 0.561*** 0.525*** 0.515*** 0.561***
(0.0838) (0.0834) (0.0839) (0.0827) (0.171) (0.169) (0.175) (0.170)
PC economy -0.00842 -0.116 -0.0888 -0.0416 -0.0994 0.0971 0.0185 -0.0117
(0.100) (0.0846) (0.0856) (0.101) (0.198) (0.191) (0.195) (0.201)
PC gender -0.158 -0.156 -0.172 -0.197 0.320 0.318 0.209 0.390
(0.153) (0.152) (0.154) (0.152) (0.319) (0.317) (0.325) (0.319)
EPL (perm.) -0.601* -0.359 1.742** 1.404
(0.327) (0.339) (0.824) (0.858)
WB centralization 2.196** 1.714 -4.695** -3.908*
(1.016) (1.049) (2.028) (2.078)
UB 0.0133* 0.0103 -0.00537 0.00282
(0.00719) (0.00724) (0.0156) (0.0154)
Constant 1.934*** -0.171 0.507* 0.596 -2.682 2.825*** 1.180* -0.553
(0.715) (0.483) (0.283) (0.949) (1.865) (0.922) (0.614) (2.282)
Observations 120 120 120 120 100 100 100 100
R-squared 0.434 0.442 0.435 0.465 0.525 0.530 0.496 0.548
Country FE
Year FE
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: 2SLS - Role of Expected Wage Volatility
2nd Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV: EPL IV: WB IV: UB IV: All
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR
Vol(EW) -1.851 -0.674 -0.867 -0.755
(3.131) (0.507) (1.634) (0.533)
PC maternity 0.0382 0.0912 0.0825 0.0876
(0.238) (0.0773) (0.118) (0.0848)
PC economy -0.269 -0.0843 -0.115 -0.0970
(0.534) (0.113) (0.275) (0.122)
PC gender -0.346 -0.0803 -0.124 -0.0986
(0.795) (0.181) (0.408) (0.196)
Constant 4.500 3.386*** 3.569** 3.463***
(3.025) (0.535) (1.574) (0.568)
Observations 91 91 91 91
Country FE
Year FE
1st Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Vol(EW) Vol(EW) Vol(EW) Vol(EW)
PC maternity -0.0534 -0.0433 -0.0517 -0.0507
(0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108)
PC economy -0.135 -0.195 -0.153 -0.183
(0.122) (0.118) (0.117) (0.129)
PC gender -0.242 -0.298 -0.227 -0.301
(0.205) (0.207) (0.203) (0.211)
EPL (perm.) -0.312 -0.104
(0.541) (0.566)
WB centralization 1.830 1.714
(1.320) (1.388)
UB 0.00514 0.00347
(0.00973) (0.00991)
Constant 1.636 0.300 0.853** 0.509
(1.245) (0.575) (0.385) (1.519)
Observations 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.433 0.447 0.433 0.449
Country FE
Year FE
F-stat 0.682
p-value 0.567
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5 DSGE Model
In order to study how labor market institutions can affect household fertility, we build a DSGE
model with enough features to describe the household’s fertility decision but also the heteroge-
nous impact of different labor market institutions. In particular, in our model children are
irriversible (i.e. births are non-negative) and provide households with direct and durable util-
ity, but also entail two types of costs: (i) a consumption cost that enters the household budget
constraint, and (ii) a time cost for women in terms of time away from work and leisure. We also
include several labor market frictions: search and matching frictions in the labor market, Nash
bargaining over wages and hours, firm vacancy posting costs, and Rotemberg-type adjustment
costs for wages and employment with an asymmetric component that creates downward rigidity.
We highlight the terms that relate to the household fertility decision in red and parameters
that relate to labor market frictions in blue. In particular we are interested in frictions that
have an empirical counterpart: (i) the separation rate (related to EPL), (ii) the unemployment
benefit, and (iii) parameters governing wage and employment adjustment costs, which can be
compared to RWR and UR more generally.17
5.1 The Labor Market
Search and matching frictions generate unemployment in a labor market that is divided into two
segments based on gender, in which females and males can be denoted respectively by i = F,M .
Job seekers uit and firm vacancies v
i
t need to match to become productive, following a constant
returns to scale matching technology. We denote by qit the probability for a firm to fill an open
gender-specific vacancy and by f it the probability for a female or male worker to find a job.
An exogenous fraction s of jobs is destroyed each period and new gender-specific matches mit
become operative in the same period. The unemployment rate urit is the fraction of female and
male workers without employment after the matching process has taken place.
Matching:
mit = m(u
i
t)
ζ(vit)
1−ζ
Job-seekers:
uit = 1− (1− s)eit−1 (1)
Job-filling:
qit =
mit
vit
= m
(
vit
uit
)−ζ
(2)
Job-finding:
f it =
mit
uit
= m
(
vit
uit
)1−ζ
(3)
Employment:
eit = (1− s)eit−1 + vitqit (4)
Unemployment rate:
urit = 1− eit (5)
17Other parameters that relate to labor market frictions include vacancy posting costs and matching function
efficiency, both corresponding to employment rigidities. Employment rigidities correspond to parameters: χe,
ψe, s, κ, and m, whereas real wage rigidities correspond to parameters: χw, ψw, ηi, and b. Note that we do
not yet have model counterparts for union strength nor the centralization of the wage bargaining process, and
that worker bargaining power is not an adequate proxy. Nash bargaining, calibrated to standard parameters,
induces too much volatility in wages (highly procyclical movements reflecting high worker bargaining power),
which dampens the cyclical movement in firms’ incentives to hire. Therefore, a high value for worker bargaining
power ηi traslates into more flexible wages.
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5.2 Household Optimization
The representative household, consisting of a female and male member18, jointly maximizes
lifetime expected utility subject to its budget constraint. Consumption is pooled inside the
household to perfectly insure against employment fluctuations. Utility is derived from con-
sumption ct, leisure of the female l
F
t and male l
M
t , and children nt. Households earn income
from wage labor, unemployment benefits b and interest on bonds at. Females and males work
hit hours at wage w
i
t, where the employment rate is e
i
t. Households optimize consumption, bond
holdings, and fertility at each period. The number of children in the household follows a de-
cay of δn, which represents the proportion of children reaching adulthood in each period, akin
to models of probabilistic ageing (Gertler, 1999). The number of new births is non-negative,
such that having children is an irriversible decision and has long-lasting utility and costs. The
household optimization problem can be expressed as:
max
ct,at,nt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ct, l
F
t , l
M
t , nt
)
= maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln (ct)−
∑
i
σil
(
hit
)1+ξ
1 + ξ
eit+σn ln (nt)
}
s.t. BC:
ct+φcnt +
at
ptrt
=
∑
i
with
i
te
i
t +
∑
i
b
(
1− eit
)
+
at−1
pt
Leisure:
lMt = 1− hMt (6)
lFt = 1− hFt −φl (nt)ψl (7)
Number of children:
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + birthst (8)
birthst ≥ 0
where birthst is the birth rate at time t. This problem can be rewritten as:
max
ct,at,nt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln (ct)−
∑
i
σil
(
hit
)1+ξ
1 + ξ
eit+σn ln (nt)
}
+βtλt
(∑
i
with
i
te
i
t +
∑
i
b
(
1− eit
)
+
at−1
pt
− ct−φcnt − at
ptrt
)
The first order conditions with respect to consumption, bond holdings, and the number of
children yields:
λt =
1
ct
(9)
λt
ptrt
=
βEtλt+1
Etpt+1
(10)
σn
nt
+ σFl (h
F
t )
ξeFt ψlφl (nt)
ψl−1 = λt
(
φc + w
F
t e
F
t ψlφl (nt)
ψl−1
)
(11)
18Each household is thought of as a continuum of members along the unit interval.
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5.3 Firms
Firms use labor (employment eit and hours h
i
t) and capital kt as inputs in a constant returns
to scale production function. They choose vacancy posting vit and investment it to maximize
the expected sum of discounted profits given the production function, evolution of capital,
and adjustment costs for wages and employment. Adjustment costs are convex and may be
asymmetric, allowing for downward rigidities whereby wages and employment are more easily
increased than cut. ν captures the degree of indexation of wages to the gross inflation rate pit.
Total labor supply is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of female and male
workers, where ρ determines the substitution elasticity19 and θ is the firms’ relative preference
for female workers20.
max
vt,it
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
λt
λ0
[
yt −
∑
i
with
i
te
i
t(1 +AC
i
w,t)−
∑
i
ACie,t −
∑
i
κvit
λt
− it
]}
s.t.
yt = ztk
α
t
[
θ
(
hFt e
F
t
)ρ
+ (1− θ) (hMt eMt )ρ] 1−αρ (12)
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it (13)
pii,wt =
wit
wit−1
pit (14)
pit =
pt
pt−1
ACiw,t =
χw
2
(
pii,wt
piνt
− 1
)2
+
1
ψw2
(
exp
{
−ψw
(
pii,wt
piνt
− 1
)}
+ ψw
(
pii,wt
piνt
− 1
)
− 1
)
(15)
ACie,t =
χe
2
(
eit
eit−1
− 1
)2
+
1
ψe2
(
exp
{
−ψe
(
eit
eit−1
− 1
)}
+ ψe
(
eit
eit−1
− 1
)
− 1
)
(16)
Technology follows an AR(1) stochastic process:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εzt (17)
εzt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
The first order condition with respect to vacancies yields a job creation condition. This
equates expected vacancy posting costs to the value of a filled vacancy, given by revenues
from output net of wages and adjustment costs for wages and employment, plus the expected
continuation value of the job next period.
Jit ≡
κ
λtqit
= MPeit−withit(1+ACiw,t)−
ACi
′
e,t
eit−1
+βEt
{
λt+1
λt
[
(1− s)Jit+1 +
ACi
′
e,t+1e
i
t+1
ei2t
]}
(18)
19The elasticity of substitution between female and male labor in production is 1/(1 − ρ). ρ → 0 represents
perfect substitution, ρ→ −∞ represents a Leontief production function, and ρ→ 1 represents the Cobb Douglas
case.
20This gender bias in employment will determine the extent of gender discrimination in employment. θ = 0.5
implies no gender discrimination, whereas firms discriminate against females when θ < 0.5.
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where
ACi
′
e,t =
∂ACie,t
∂(eit/e
i
t−1)
= χe
(
eit
eit−1
− 1
)
+
1
ψe
[
1− exp
{
−ψe
(
eit
eit−1
− 1
)}]
(19)
MPeFt =
θ(1− α)yt(hFt eFt )(ρ−1)hFt
ht
(20)
MPeMt =
(1− θ)(1− α)yt(hMt eMt )(ρ−1)hMt
ht
(21)
ht = θ
(
hFt e
F
t
)ρ
+ (1− θ) (hMt eMt )ρ (22)
Maximizing with respect to capital yields Tobin’s Q for investment decisions (the shadow
price of capital), which equates the marginal cost of investment to its expected benefit (the
marginal product of capital):
1 = α
yt
kt
+ β
Et(λt+1)
λt
(1− δ) (23)
5.4 Nash Bargaining over Wages and Hours
Nominal wages and hours worked are bargained by maximizing the Nash product of worker and
firm surpluses:
max
wit,h
i
t
(Nit −Uit)ηi(Jit)1−ηi
for i = F,M . The exogenous gender-specific bargaining power of workers is denoted by ηi
and determines how the joint surplus is shared between the worker and firm. Nit denotes the
marginal value of employment, which comprises wage income net of labor disutility, plus the
continuation value of being employed. Uit denotes the marginal value of unemployment, which
comprises unemployment benefits plus the continuation value of being unemployed.
Nit = w
i
th
i
t −
σil
λt
(
hit
)1+ξ
1 + ξ
+ βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
[1− (1− f it+1)s]Nit+1 + s(1− f it+1)Uit+1
)}
Uit = b+ βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
f it+1N
i
t+1 + (1− f it+1)Uit+1
)}
5.4.1 Wages
Bargaining over the nominal wage yields an optimal sharing rule similar to the standard Nash
bargaining solution:21
ωitJ
i
t = (1− ωit)(Nit −Uit)
with ωit being the effective time-varying bargaining power of the worker:
ωit ≡
ηi
ηi + (1− ηi)τ it
(24)
and where τ it reflects the evolution of current and expected wage adjustment costs:
τ it ≡ −
∂Jit/∂w
i
t
∂(Nit −Uit)/∂wit
= 1 +ACiw,t +AC
i′
w,t
pii,wt
piνt
− (1− s)βEt
{
λt+1
λt
ACi
′
w,t+1
hit+1
hit
(pii,wt+1)
2
pi1+νt+1
}
(25)
21See derivations by Arseneau and Chugh (2007).
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)
+
1
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[
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{
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(
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(26)
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′
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∂(pii,wt+1/pi
ν
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= χw
(
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− 1
)
+
1
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[
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{
−ψw
(
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− 1
)}]
In the absence of adjustment costs, τ it is equal to 1, and we obtain the constant sharing rule
with ωit= ηi. With adjustment costs the bargaining power becomes state-dependent. During
periods of rising wages, ACi
′
w,t > 0, the effective bargaining power of workers decline whereas
during periods of declining wages, the bargaining power of workers increase. The asymmetry
in the wage adjustment cost function magnifies this effect, i.e. bargaining power increases by
more in recessions than it is reduced in expansions.
The bargained wage becomes:
ωitκ
λtqit
= (1− ωit)
[
with
i
t −
σil
λt
(
hit
)1+ξ
1 + ξ
− b+ β(1− s)Et
(
ωit+1
1− ωit+1
κ
λtqit+1
(1− f it+1)
)]
(27)
We can define a wage gap as:
Φt ≡ w
M
t
wFt
(28)
5.4.2 Hours
The number of hours worked also reflect bargaining between the worker and firm, optimized
to maximize their joint surplus. In the absence of wage adjustment costs, the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and hours worked (mrsit =
σil
λt
(
hit
)ξ
) equates the marginal
product of labor of an hour of work for the firm (mplit =
∂2yt
∂eith
i
t
), adjusted for the relative price.
Wage adjustment costs reduce hours worked by reducing net productivity, introducing a wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor (the latter needs
to be higher to compensate for the deadweight loss of the adjustment cost). A second effect
leads to an intertemporal reallocation of hours worked, whereby hours increase when wages are
larger than the marginal rate of substitution and wages are growing. In these ways, the second
term on the right captures the change in costs due to current and expected wage changes.
ηi
(
1− ωit
ωit
)(
wit −
σil
λt
(
hit
)ξ)
= −(1− ηi)
[
∂MPeit
∂hit
− wit(1 +ACiw,t)
]
(29)
where:
∂MPeFt
∂hFt
= θ(1− α)yt(eFt hFt )ρ−1
[
ρ
hρt
+ θ(1− α− ρ) 1
h2ρt
(eFt h
F
t )
ρ
]
(30)
and
∂MPeMt
∂hMt
= (1− θ)(1− α)yt(eMt hMt )ρ−1
[
ρ
hρt
+ (1− θ)(1− α− ρ) 1
h2ρt
(eMt h
M
t )
ρ
]
(31)
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5.5 Closure
The monetary authority adopts an augmented Taylor rule with nominal interest rate smoothing
according to parameter ρr and responds to deviations from target inflation and output growth.
The term εrt captures an i.i.d monetary policy shock.
rt = r
ρr
t−1
[
r
(pit
pi
)ωpi ( yt
yt−1
)ωy]1−ρr
εrt (32)
εrt ∼ N
(
0, σ2r
)
The resource constraint states that output may be used for consumption or investment or
to cover for adjustment costs to wages and employment (deadweight losses):
ct + it = yt −
∑
i
ACiw,tw
i
th
i
te
i
t −
∑
i
ACie,t (33)
6 Model Dynamics
6.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model similar to Abbritti and Fahr (2011) and Doepke et al. (2007). The
parameter values and description are summarized in Table 9. The quarterly discount factor β
is 0.992, yielding an annual rate of 0.97.
The labor market parameters governing the search and matching process are calibrated
to match steady state values. The matching function elasticity parameter ζ is set to 0.5 as in
Abbritti and Fahr (2013). The separation rate is set to match a steady state job-finding rate
of 0.35 and unemployment rate of 0.08 for males. Given these two values, we than obtain the
separation rate of 0.041, which we assume is the same for both genders. Given the separation
rate and job filling rate of 0.9, we can obtain the matching efficiency parameter m which yields
0.561.
The parameters relating to fertility are calibrated to match empirical facts such as average
fertility rates, female time spent with kids, and costs of raising children. The rate at which
children reach adulthood δn is 0.025, implying 10 years of child-related utility and costs. The
function describing the time cost of children has level parameter φl of 0.088, corresponding to
an average fertility rate of 2 kids per family, 3 daily hours allocated by females to care for their
children22, and a curvature parameter ψl of 0.5. The parameter describing expenditures per
child φc at 0.075 corresponds to 15% of parental net income in steady state, in line with OECD
countries such as Norway and Canada.23 The parameter describing preference for children in
the utility function σn is 0.398, consistent with an average fertility rate of 2 kids per household.
Parameters governing the supply of labor are calibrated to match gender-specific unemploy-
ment and hours worked. Male disutility of labor parameter σMl is set at 102.4, corresponding to
8 daily working hours and an unemployment rate of 7%. Female disutility of labor parameter
σFl is set at 475.5, corresponding to 5.3 daily working hours and an unemployment rate of 8%.
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply ξ is set at 4.0 as in Trigari (2009) and Christoffel et al.
(2009).
22We assume female working hours to be 66% of their male counterparts. This is consistent with U.S. Time
Use data for years 2005-2013, in which fathers in full-time employment work 6 daily hours compared to an
average of 4 hours for mothers in either full or part-time employment. We implicitly assume that childcare is
an imperfect substitute for females and that a trade-off exists between working and having children in women’s
time endowment.
23The average annual cost of raising children was estimated at 18% of household income for Norway in 2014
(source: SIFO) and for Canada in 2011 (source: Fraser Institute).
23
Capital has a share α of 0.3 in the firm production function and depreciates at rate δ of 3%.
The elasticity of substitution parameter between females and males in production ρ is 0.65 as in
Doepke et al. (2007). Firms have a relative preference for males over females given by θ at 0.44,
which corresponds to a 12% gender wage gap (lower than the 16% average for OECD countries
over 2000-13). Workers’ bargaining power is higher for males ηM at 0.5 than for females ηF at
0.35. Firm vacancy posting costs help calibrate the job-finding and job-filling rates, suggesting
κ at 0.566 implying total vacancy posting costs amount to 3.5% of GDP.
Wage and employment adjustment costs are 0 in the baseline. In the UR setup, we set
χe at 1.25 and ψe at 1,700 making it more costly to lay-off workers than to fire them. In the
RWR setup, we set χw at 36.6 and ψw at 24,100 making wages downward rigid. Wages are
not indexed against inflation such that ν is 0. These parameter values are taken directly from
Abbritti and Fahr (2013) in which they are calibrated to match the volatility and skewness of
wage inflation and employment.
The Taylor rule places a weight ωpi of 1.5 on inflation and ωy of 0 on output growth, with
interest rate persistence ρr of 0.85. The monetary policy shock has 0 persistence and standard
deviation σr of 0.001. The technology shock has persistence ρz of 0.95 and standard deviation
σz of 0.0064. These values are the same as Abbritti and Fahr (2013).
Table 9: Parameter Values
Param. Value Description Source
Households
β 0.992 Time discount factor 0.97 annual rate
σMl 102.4 Disutility of labor - males 8/24 time allocation by males to work in SS.
σFl 475.5 Disutility of labor - females 5.3/24 time allocation by females to work in SS.
ξ 4.0 Frisch elasticity of labor supply Trigari (2009), Christoffel et al. (2009).
σn 0.398 Utility weight on children Corresponds to 2 children per household in SS.
δn 0.025 Children’s depreciation (cost & utility) 10 years of childhood.
ψl 0.5 Time cost of children (curvature) 0.33 in Doepke et al. (2007)
φl 0.088 Time cost of children (level) 3/24 time allocation by females to children in SS.
φc 0.075 Consumption cost of children (level) 15% of parental net income in SS (OECD).
Firm production
α 0.3 Share of capital in production Standard
δ 0.03 Capital depreciation rate 12% annual rate
ηM 0.5 Male workers exog. bargaining power Bla (2010)
ηF 0.35 Female workers exog. bargaining power Corresponds to urFSS = 0.08
θ 0.44 Firms’ preference for female workers Corresponds to 12% wage gap in SS (16% in OECD).
ρ 0.65 Elasticity of substitution males/females Doepke et al. (2007)
κ 0.566 Cost of posting a vacancy Corresponds to qFSS = 0.95 and f=0.35 in SS (6% of GDP).
Labor Market
ζ 0.5 Elasticity of matching function Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
b 0.079 Unemployment benefit Corresponds to 66% replacement rate in SS.
s 0.041 Separation rate Corresponds to urMSS = 0.07 and f
M
SS = 0.35
m 0.561 CRS matching technology Corresponds to qMSS = 0.9 (Ravenna and Walsh (2011))
Adjustment costs (baseline all 0)
ν 0 Wage indexation to inflation Abbritti and Fahr (2013)
χw 36.6 Adjustment cost parameter - wages Abbritti and Fahr (2013): match volatility of wage inflation
ψw 24100 Asymmetry parameter - wages Abbritti and Fahr (2013): match skewness of wage inflation
χe 50 Adjustment cost parameter - employment Abbritti and Fahr (2013): match volatility of employment
ψe 1700 Asymmetry parameter - employment Abbritti and Fahr (2013): match skewness of employment
Monetary policy
ρr 0.85 Persistence of interest rate Abbritti and Fahr (2013)
ωpi 1.5 Weight of inflation in Taylor rule Abbritti and Fahr (2013)
ωy 0 Weight of output growth in Taylor rule Abbritti and Fahr (2013)
Exogenous shocks
σz 0.0064 Std. deviation of technology shocks Smets and Wouters (2003)
σmp 0.001 Std. deviation of monetary policy shock Christoffel et al. (2009)
σrp 0.001 Std. deviation of risk premium shock Christoffel et al. (2009)
ρz 0.95 Persistence of technology shock Smets and Wouters (2003)
ρrp 0.8 Persistence of risk premium shock Christoffel et al. (2009)
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6.2 Impulse responses in Set-Up with Wage Adjustment Costs
Figure 1 and 2 display impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive and negative
monetary policy shock. In response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, firms would like
to cut wages and employment. In a setting with downward wage rigidities (χw at 36.6 and ψw
at 24,100), wages are cut less than the fall in prices, leading to an increase in real wages. This
aggravates the contraction of the business cycle with a steep rise in unemployment rates and
large fall in consumption and output. This amplification effect is mirrored in household fertility
decisions. Downward wage rigidities lead to asymmetric responses of fertility, with moderate
increases in booms and large drops in births during recessions.
Wage adjustment costs in steady state are zero by construction and are not affected by
the wage rigidity parameters. By contrast, the stochastic steady state, which considers a large
number of simulated shocks, leads to lower fertility compared to the deterministic steady state.
In other words, wage rigidities in the presence of economic shocks, reduce average fertility rates,
consistent with our empirical findings.
Figure 3 displays impulse responses to a positive and negative technology shock. Here, the
presence of wage adjustment costs play less of a role as real wages are procyclical and result in
lower real distortions. Also in this case fertility is procyclical and wage rigidities amplify real
effects and fertility response, with the exception of real prices.
Figure 1: IRF to Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 2: IRF to Monetary Policy Shock (cont.)
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Figure 3: IRF to Technology Shock
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6.3 Impulse responses in Set-Up with Employment Adjustment Costs
Figures 4 and 5 display impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive and negative
monetary policy shock. As the previous case, in response to a contractionary monetary policy
shock, firms would like to cut wages and employment. In a setting with downward employment
rigidities (χe at 50 and ψe at 1700), employment can be adjusted less and firms reduce nominal
wages to compensate the fall in prices. The final effect is that nominal wages fall less than
prices, so real wages rise. Therefore, employment rigidities dampen the real effects of business-
cycles on output, consumption and employment but not on real wages. On the other hand, the
effect of downward employment rigidities on fertility decisions seems negligible and the response
is not significantly asymmetric. Under our preliminary calibration the effect of wage volatility
prevails over employment volatility in driving expected wage volatility.
Figure 6 displays impulse responses to a positive and negative technology shock. Employ-
ment rigidities dampen unemployment but amplify the fertility response. On the other hand
there is no effect on consumption, output and investment. In this case the response of volatility
of expected wage is in line with our expectations and empirical findings.
Figure 4: IRF to Monetary Policy Shock
28
Figure 5: IRF to Monetary Policy Shock (cont.)
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Figure 6: IRF to Technology Shock
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7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of labor market institutions that do not explicitly target mater-
nity, in explaining household fertility decisions. We use a panel dataset for 20 OECD countries
spanning 1961-2014 including 11 different labor market institutions and estimate panel regres-
sions for the effect of these institutions on total fertility rates. We analyze the different roles
played by different categories of LMIs, dividing them into employment rigidities (ER) versus
real wage rigidities (RWR). This differentiation is important since the former is expected to
reduce the volatility of unemployment, whereas the latter reduces the volatility of wages but
increases the volatility of unemployment. Since fertility decisions are affected by the possibility
of large income shocks, the volatility of unemployment and wages can play a crucial part.
We estimate panel regressions controlling for country and time fixed effects and features
such as maternity benefits, economic conditions, and gender inequality. We find that employ-
ment rigidities such as employment protection legislation and union strength24 tend to increase
fertility. On the other hand, real wage rigidities such as wage bargaining centralization and
unemployment benefits tend to decrease fertility.
We study a mechanism that links LMIs and fertility through volatility of unemployment
and expected wages. We find that unemployment and expected wage volatility is associated
with lower fertility. We also find that employment rigidities such as EPL, reduce the volatility
of employment and expected wages, whereas wage rigidities such as centralized wage bargaining
centralization and unemployment benefits, increase these volatilities. Results using two stage
least squares regressions show that instrumenting the volatility of expected wages and unem-
ployment by these LMIs, we find a negative correlation with fertility, confirming our previous
results. We remain cautious in interpreting this as proving the role of unemployment volatility
but rather simply not excluding this channel.
We then build a DSGE model in which we incorporate household fertility decisions and
a large set of labor market frictions. We examine the role of Rotemberg-type wage and em-
ployment adjustment costs with an asymmetric component that generates downward wage and
employment rigidities. Downward wage rigidities amplify real contractions in response to neg-
ative demand shocks and lead to large drops in employment and fertility. As a result of this
amplification effect in the presence of demand shocks, downward wage rigidities also reduce the
stochastic steady state for fertility. Downward employment rigidities instead, in response to
negative demand shocks, tend to dampen the real effects of business-cycles, with the exception
of real wages. Indeed nominal wages fall less than prices, so real wages rise. On the other hand,
the effect on fertility decision seems to be negligible. For further research we could explore the
role of price adjustment costs and occasionally binding constraints in increasing the respon-
siveness of expected wages to unemployment. The former can give us better dynamics for real
wages and the latter could capture the irreversibly nature of fertility decision.
This link we identify between labor market rigidities and fertility has relevant policy im-
plications. For instance decentralization of wage bargaining could be an alternative to family-
targeted policies. Lowering employment protection could dampen the effects of policies that
favor fertility. To the extent that labor market reforms affect business cycle volatility, and espe-
cially the volatility of unemployment, this may also play a role in household fertility decisions.
24Whereas a priori we remain agnostic about the predominance of union bargaining over wages versus manning
ratios, our empirical findings suggest the latter dominates in our data.
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Appendix
Figure 7: TFR vs. Average Birth Rate
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Figure 8: Heterogeneity in Total Fertility Rates
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Figure 9: Birth Rate, by Age Group
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Table 10: Description of Labor Market Institutions
LMI Description Source
Employment protection for
temporary contracts
Measures the strictness of regulation on the use of fixed-term and temporary work agency
contracts. It is expressed in a 0-6 scale.
OECD
Employment protection for
permanent contracts
Measures the strictness of regulation of individual dismissal of employees on regular/indefinite
contracts. It is expressed in a 0-6 scale.
OECD
Union density
It represents the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total
number of wage and salary earners. It is constructed using both survey and administrative data.
OECD
Union coverage
This indicator refers to the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements normalized
on employment.
CEP-OECD
Union concentration
Summary measure of concentration of unions at industry and sectoral level.
It ranges between 0-1.
ITCWSS
Wage bargaining
centralization
Summary measure of centralization of wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and
concentration at multiple levels. Derived from Iversens centralization index, it ranges between 0-1.
ITCWSS
Government intervention
in wage bargaining
Index of government intervention in the wage bargaining process. It spans between 1 and 5,
where 1 means no intervention.
ITCWSS
Wage bargaining level
Index between 0 and 5, which indicates the predominant level where the wage bargaining takes
place. e.g. firm level, industry, nation level.
ITCWSS
Extension of collective
agreements
Mandatory extension of collective agreements to non-organized employers. It has a 0-3 scale,
where 3 indicates that the extension is virtually automatic and more or less general.
ITCWSS
Minimum wage
Degree of government intervention and discretion in setting the minimum wage.
It ranges between 0 and 8, where 0 indicates no minimum wage.
ITCWSS
Unemployment benefit
Benefit replacement rates, which indicates the average across the first five years of
unemployment for three family situations and two money levels.
OECD
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Labor Market Institutions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Employment protection (temp.) 1080 1.91 1.46 .25 5.25
Employment protection (perm.) 1080 2.13 .98 .26 5
Union density 1080 39.73 19.24 7.55 83.86
Union coverage 1080 68.9 25.22 7 99
Wage bargaining centralization 1080 .4 .18 .08 .98
Union concentration 1080 .32 .11 .14 .59
Gov. Intervention 1080 2.65 1.26 1 5
Level of wage bargaining 1080 3.04 1.32 1 5
Ext. of coll. Agreements 1080 1.43 1.26 0 3
Minimum wage 1080 -3.87 3.05 -8 0
Unemployment benefit 1080 26.13 13.56 0 65.21
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Family allowance, av. per child (USD) 1080 105 76 0 433
Maternity benefits 1080 2165 2549 0 13363
Female labor force participation 1080 47.3 11.7 17.8 71.2
Gender wage gap 1080 38 22 -11 119
GDP growth 1080 3.0 2.6 -8.3 12.9
Unemployment rate 1080 5.8 4.1 0 26.1
NAIRU 1080 6.0 3.5 0.2 20.3
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Table 13: Correlation with Principal Components: LMIs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPL UnS WB UB
Employment protection (temp.) 0.893∗∗∗
Employment protection (perm.) 0.893∗∗∗
Union density 0.805∗∗∗
Union coverage 0.798∗∗∗
Union concentration 0.467∗∗∗
Wage bargaining centralization 0.567∗∗∗
Government intervention 0.769∗∗∗
Level of wage bargaining 0.665∗∗∗
Extension of collective agreements 0.738∗∗∗
Minimum wage 0.0397
Unemployment benefit 1
Observations 1080 1080 1080 1080
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14: Correlation with Principal Components: Controls
(1) (2) (3)
PC maternity PC gender PC economy
Family allowance 0.810∗∗∗
Maternity benefits 0.812∗∗∗
Female labor force participation -0.818∗∗∗
Gender wage gap 0.819∗∗∗
GDP growth 0.390∗∗∗
Unemployment rate -0.947∗∗∗
NAIRU -0.918∗∗∗
Observations 1080 1080 1080
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 10: ∆ TFR: Decomposition by LMI Factors
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Figure 11: ∆ TFR: Decomposition by LMI Factors and Controls
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Table 15: Robustness: LMI Factors using Fertility at t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR
EPL 0.0410* 0.0491*
(0.0249) (0.0253)
UnS 0.102*** 0.0599***
(0.0217) (0.0203)
WB -0.0615*** -0.0458***
(0.00984) (0.00933)
UB -0.00159 -0.00252**
(0.000992) (0.000990)
PC maternity 0.0474*** 0.0511*** 0.0491*** 0.0477*** 0.0543***
(0.00948) (0.00953) (0.00952) (0.00945) (0.00963)
PC economy 0.0509*** 0.0421*** 0.0463*** 0.0504*** 0.0423***
(0.00936) (0.00942) (0.00930) (0.00928) (0.00935)
PC gender 0.00824 0.0147 0.0135 0.00973 0.00640
(0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0184)
Constant 14.33*** 14.86*** 14.61*** 15.37*** 14.99***
(0.747) (0.745) (0.752) (0.728) (0.734)
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
R-squared 0.904 0.898 0.899 0.900 0.899
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Robustness: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline No CSTT GLS Wild
VARIABLES TFR TFR TFR TFR
EPL (perm. contracts) 0.277*** 0.231*** 0.308*** 0.285***
(0.0481) (0.0418) (0.0493) (0.0600)
EPL (temp. contracts) 0.00854 -0.0135 0.00630 0.0200
(0.0136) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0334)
Union density 0.00985*** 0.0105*** 0.0108*** 0.00731*
(0.00155) (0.00106) (0.00157) (0.00404)
Union coverage -0.00233** -0.00101 -0.00178* -0.00184
(0.00108) (0.000722) (0.00106) (0.00349)
Union concentration 1.008*** 0.669*** 1.068*** 0.987
(0.197) (0.190) (0.200) (0.662)
WB centralization -0.449*** -1.082*** -0.446** -0.581
(0.167) (0.148) (0.177) (0.516)
Gov. intervention in WB -0.0298*** -0.0424*** -0.0379*** -0.0255
(0.00820) (0.00905) (0.00911) (0.0241)
WB level 0.00114 -0.000729 -0.00108 0.00572
(0.00869) (0.00977) (0.00960) (0.00977)
Ext. of coll. agreements -0.0877*** 0.0507*** -0.0984*** -0.0736*
(0.0204) (0.0184) (0.0212) (0.0411)
Minimum wage -0.0272*** -0.0105* -0.0282*** -0.0296*
(0.00561) (0.00551) (0.00572) (0.0167)
Unemployment benefit -0.00246** -0.00121 -0.00224** -0.00245
(0.00104) (0.000936) (0.00104) (0.00310)
PC maternity 0.0462*** 0.0381*** 0.0473*** 0.0332*
(0.00976) (0.00979) (0.00969) (0.0190)
PC economy 0.0314*** 0.0169 0.0385*** 0.0410*
(0.00981) (0.0105) (0.00978) (0.0213)
PC gender 0.0502*** 0.127*** 0.0485** -0.0257
(0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0628)
Constant 11.45*** 2.166*** 2.711*** 2.839***
(0.855) (0.152) (0.183) (0.321)
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
R-squared 0.908 0.847 0.930
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT No
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Robustness: Individual LMIs using Fertility at t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR F.TFR
EPL (perm. contracts) 0.205*** 0.138***
(0.0482) (0.0479)
EPL (temp. contracts) 0.00528 0.0124
(0.0128) (0.0134)
Union density 0.00839*** 0.00375***
(0.00148) (0.00132)
Union coverage -0.00166 -0.00188*
(0.00104) (0.00105)
Union concentration 1.067*** 0.744***
(0.188) (0.150)
WB centralization -0.471*** -0.225*
(0.158) (0.116)
Gov. intervention in WB -0.0341*** -0.0366***
(0.00775) (0.00723)
WB level 0.000768 -0.0189**
(0.00826) (0.00787)
Ext. of coll. agreements -0.0619*** -0.0248
(0.0194) (0.0163)
Minimum wage -0.0294*** -0.0236***
(0.00534) (0.00550)
Unemployment benefit -0.00164 -0.00252**
(0.00100) (0.000990)
PC maternity 0.0485*** 0.0534*** 0.0504*** 0.0485*** 0.0518*** 0.0534*** 0.0489*** 0.0526*** 0.0488*** 0.0494*** 0.0458*** 0.0543***
(0.00931) (0.00956) (0.00954) (0.00953) (0.00956) (0.00945) (0.00956) (0.00943) (0.00954) (0.00956) (0.00952) (0.00963)
PC economy 0.0436*** 0.0432*** 0.0436*** 0.0486*** 0.0435*** 0.0389*** 0.0475*** 0.0447*** 0.0484*** 0.0459*** 0.0421*** 0.0423***
(0.00928) (0.00930) (0.00942) (0.00938) (0.00934) (0.00929) (0.00941) (0.00921) (0.00942) (0.00934) (0.00926) (0.00935)
PC gender 0.0289 0.0118 0.0138 0.0172 0.0186 0.0243 0.0130 0.00906 0.0122 0.0121 0.00605 0.00640
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0184)
Constant 12.61*** 14.50*** 14.99*** 14.21*** 15.25*** 14.59*** 15.09*** 15.45*** 15.26*** 15.19*** 15.63*** 14.99***
(0.826) (0.762) (0.745) (0.797) (0.739) (0.734) (0.734) (0.729) (0.736) (0.736) (0.738) (0.734)
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
R-squared 0.912 0.899 0.898 0.899 0.898 0.901 0.898 0.901 0.899 0.898 0.900 0.899
Controls
Country FE
Year FE
CSTT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: 2SLS - Impact of LMIs through Unemployment Volatility
2nd Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV: EPL IV: WB IV: UB IV: All
VARIABLES Av. birth Av. birth Av. birth Av. birth
Vol(u) -23.87* -17.80** -9.669 -16.16***
(13.95) (8.854) (7.285) (6.114)
PC maternity 1.234 1.485 1.821 1.553
(2.159) (1.680) (1.221) (1.553)
PC economy 1.550 1.634 1.745 1.656
(2.213) (1.742) (1.258) (1.626)
PC gender -0.280 0.853 2.368 1.158
(4.966) (3.722) (2.763) (3.318)
Constant 88.28*** 84.16*** 78.65*** 83.05***
(11.60) (8.012) (6.248) (6.463)
Observations 109 109 109 109
Country FE
Year FE
1st Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(u) Vol(u)
PC maternity -0.0539 -0.0484 -0.0566 -0.0671
(0.0871) (0.0860) (0.0869) (0.0855)
PC economy 0.0759 -0.0281 0.00481 0.0421
(0.106) (0.0913) (0.0922) (0.106)
PC gender -0.230 -0.203 -0.238 -0.269
(0.178) (0.175) (0.178) (0.176)
EPL (perm.) -0.565* -0.327
(0.329) (0.338)
WB centralization 2.264** 1.827*
(1.050) (1.083)
UB 0.0144* 0.0121
(0.00766) (0.00761)
Constant 1.863** -0.239 0.510* 0.482
(0.745) (0.508) (0.294) (0.981)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.429 0.441 0.433 0.468
Country FE
Year FE
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: 2SLS - Impact of LMIs through Real Wage Volatility
2nd Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV: EPL IV: WB IV: UB IV: All
VARIABLES Av. birth Av. birth Av. birth Av. birth
Vol(w/p) 9.744* 7.975* 13.93 8.861**
(5.651) (4.418) (24.03) (3.897)
PC maternity -3.185 -2.106 -5.737 -2.646
(4.040) (3.258) (14.93) (3.085)
PC economy 0.472 0.488 0.433 0.480
(2.468) (2.145) (3.329) (2.303)
PC gender -1.895 -0.996 -4.022 -1.446
(5.343) (4.514) (13.64) (4.647)
Constant 65.46*** 67.23*** 61.29** 66.34***
(9.024) (7.546) (25.77) (7.639)
Observations 89 89 89 89
Country FE
Year FE
1st Stage:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p) Vol(w/p)
PC maternity 0.687*** 0.620*** 0.626*** 0.684***
(0.202) (0.197) (0.205) (0.202)
PC economy -0.0932 0.107 -0.00580 0.00638
(0.238) (0.235) (0.240) (0.245)
PC gender 0.698 0.632 0.531 0.766*
(0.436) (0.425) (0.437) (0.434)
EPL (perm.) 1.818* 1.370
(0.966) (1.000)
WB centralization -5.045** -4.200*
(2.396) (2.465)
UB -0.0111 -0.00540
(0.0191) (0.0187)
Constant -3.053 2.876** 1.151 -0.416
(2.253) (1.109) (0.730) (2.731)
Observations 89 89 89 89
R-squared 0.508 0.514 0.482 0.531
Country FE
Year FE
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 12: Employment protection, permanent contracts
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Figure 13: Employment protection, temporary contracts
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Figure 14: Union density
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Figure 15: Union coverage
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Figure 16: Union concentration
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Figure 17: Wage bargaining centralization
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Figure 18: Government intervention
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Figure 19: Ext. of collective agreements
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Figure 20: Level of wage bargaining
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Figure 21: Minimum wage
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Figure 22: Unemployment benefit
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Figure 23: Level of wage bargaining
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Figure 24: Minimum wage
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Figure 25: Unemployment benefit
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Figure 26: Family allowance, av. per child (USD)
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Figure 27: maternity benefits
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Figure 28: Female labor force participation
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Figure 29: Gender wage gap
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Figure 30: GDP growth
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Figure 31: Unemployment rate
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Figure 32: NAIRU
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